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Abstract
Background: Current guidelines do not clearly outline when assent should be attained from paediatric research
participants, nor do they detail the necessary elements of the assent process. This stems from the fact that the
fundamental justification behind the concept of assent is misunderstood. In this paper, we critically assess three
widespread ethical arguments used for assent: children’s rights, the best interests of the child, and respect for a
child’s developing autonomy. We then outline a newly-developed two-fold justification for the assent process:
respect for the parent’s pedagogical role in teaching their child to become an autonomous being and respect
for the child’s moral worth.
Discussion: We argue that the ethical grounding for the involvement of young children in medical decision-making
does not stem from children’s rights, the principle of best interests, or respect for developing autonomy. An alternative
strategy is to examine the original motivation to engage with the child. In paediatric settings there are two obligations on
the researcher: an obligation to the parents who are responsible for determining when and under what circumstances
the child develops his capacity for autonomy and reasoning, and an obligation to the child himself. There is an important
distinction between respecting a decision and encouraging a decision. This paper illustrates that the process of assent is
an important way in which respect for the child as an individual can be demonstrated, however, the value lies not in the
child’s response but the fact that his views were solicited in the first place.
Summary: This paper demonstrates that the common justifications for the process of assent are incomplete. Assent
should be understood as playing a pedagogical role for the child, helping to teach him how specific decisions are made
and therefore helping him to become a better decision-maker. How the researcher engages with the child supports his
obligation to the child’s parents, yet why the researcher engages with the child stems from the child’s moral worth.
Treating a child as having moral worth need not mean doing what they say but it may mean listening, considering,
engaging or involving them in the decision.
Keywords: Assent, Research ethics, Children’s rights, Moral worth, Autonomy, Best interests
Background
In paediatric research, the enrolment process requires
permission from the parents (i.e. proxy informed consent)
with additional assent from the child in some cases1 [1].
Assent is generally defined as “a child’s affirmative agree-
ment to participate in research” [2], however current
guidelines do not clearly outline when assent should be
attained, nor do they detail the necessary elements of the
assent process [3, 4]. Instead, it has been left to paediatric
researchers and local Research Ethics Committees to
determine both when a child’s assent is required and how
that assent should be taken and recorded [5]. The import-
ance of this area of research has recently been highlighted
with the publication of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics
report on children and clinical research [4]. While the goal
of the assent process is to involve those children who are
sufficiently able to participate in the decision-making
process, while excluding those who are not, there remains
significant disagreement and lack of clarity about what
counts as “sufficiently able” and how to properly assess
which children are judged to be so. Consequently, re-
search related to assent has attempted to justify a uniform
rule for establishing which children should be asked for
assent. This has led researchers to recommend various
age-related cut-offs for assent [6, 7], while others have
come to question the very validity or usefulness of assent
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[8]. Perhaps the reason that no consensus has been estab-
lished stems from the fact that these conflicting views
represent an attempt to provide an answer before the
question itself is properly understood: namely what is the
fundamental justification behind the concept of assent?
Many children and perhaps all who are under the age
of 10 are not considered to be sufficiently competent to
make their own decisions regarding their participation
in clinical research. Instead, provision is usually made
for a parent or guardian to consent to participation on
behalf of the child. This method of dealing with enrolment
would seem to leave little reason for involving children in
the decision-making process. Yet the existence of the con-
cept and practice of assent illustrates that the medical
community is still motivated to include some children in
this process even if they are not believed to be capable of
making the decision. What matters here, then, is how to
justify their involvement in the decision-making process.
That is, there seems to be a general sense that we should
involve these children, but it’s not immediately clear why
this is warranted. Because it is not immediately clear why,
it is also not clear how and when they should be involved.
Current literature cites a number of different ethical justi-
fications for some form of assent process, including refer-
ence to a child’s human rights [9–12] or respect for the
child’s developing autonomy [3, 13, 14]. Without being
able to agree on the fundamental justification for an assent
process, it is not surprising that it is difficult to determine
what assent is and how it should be documented.
In this paper, we start by critically assessing three of
the most widespread current ethical arguments used for
assent: children’s rights, the best interests of the child,
and respect for a child’s developing autonomy. We then
outline a newly-developed two-fold justification for the
assent process: respect for the parent’s pedagogical role
in teaching their child to become an autonomous being
and respect for the child’s moral worth.2 This novel jus-
tification for assent is just that: a justification for the
assent process. This paper is not concerned with why the
original recommendations for assent were put in place or
by whom. Instead, we are interested in outlining a solid
ethical justification for involving a child in the decision-
making process about his participation in clinical research.
It is important to note that in this paper assent is de-
fined not as the child’s affirmative answer but rather the
participation of the child in the overall decision-making
process: focusing on the ongoing process rather than a
specific answer [4]. Just as consent is not about getting
the person to agree (or to consent) but, properly under-
stood, is about allowing the person to decide (one way
or the other), assent here refers to a process of engaging
with a non-competent or partially competent individual
and giving him an opportunity to have a say. In what fol-
lows, ‘assent’ will be taken to refer to a process of engaging
with or involving the child in the decision-making, not sim-
ply getting the child to agree, to ‘go along’, or to cooperate.
It is important not to underestimate this point. In order to
remind the reader that what we mean by assent is the
process of engagement, rather than the solicitation of a spe-
cific answer, we will refer to assent throughout the remain-
der of this paper as “assent*”. In addition, our discussion of
assent* for the purposes of this paper concentrates specific-
ally on the research context rather than the clinical context.
We also will not discuss the differences between thera-
peutic and non-therapeutic research as the aim of the paper
is to develop the primary justification for how and why we
engage with the child, regardless of the type of research in
question or its potential risks and benefits.
Finally, the reader should remember that this paper
is a philosophical one, but as such it makes no presup-
positions, negative or positive, about a child’s ability to
meaningfully engage in decision-making, nor does it
question the extent to which children can meaning-
fully participate in decision-making. In our view children,
like adults, should be given the opportunity to consent to
participate in research when they are autonomous. How-
ever there is a range of children who are not autonomous
but for whom engagement with researchers and other
adults may be meaningful. It is children in this category
for whom assent* would seem to be appropriate. This
paper is an attempt to understand and clarify the justifica-
tion for involving these children in the decision-making
process. It is true that much of western bioethics has been
focused on the capacity to be autonomous as the primary
marker of decision-making capacity [and so with par-
ticular conceptions of consent]. This paper presents a
direct challenge to this orthodoxy by introducing a
non-autonomy-based justification for understanding our
obligations to children. As such, it runs counter to the
prevailing analytic philosophy approach. However, in
order to develop a compelling argument, one that might
be persuasive to all readers, the paper begins with the
orthodoxy in order to demonstrate its limits. Being clear
about the justification requires asking “why should we in-
volve children?” which makes it appear to be negative or
sceptical. This is a key step in the philosophical method,
but it does not mean that our position is a negative one;
indeed, our conclusion is precisely the reverse. This
method does not see the child as alien, nor does it dismiss
the child until he reaches an adult age. The paper seeks to
be clear about why children are not alien and why we
should engage with them before they are adults.
Discussion
Children’s rights
It has widely been suggested that children are wrongly
denied their lawful human rights of freedom and auton-
omy on the false premise that their chronological age
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automatically renders them incompetent [9–12]. In this
argument, the age-based boundary between childhood
and adulthood is viewed as arbitrary, and therefore un-
fair. With a sharp age cut-off, a younger individual may
possess the necessary competencies for the holding of a
specific right or making certain decisions while an older
individual may not [12]. To assume blanket incompe-
tence across all children and all situations overlooks the
key fact that the acquisition of competence does not
occur on a perfectly linear progression [15]. By assuming
that all children under a certain age are incompetent,
they are denied the appropriate degree of respect for
their decision-making ability, and therefore they are un-
able to demonstrate their ability to accomplish the task.
Without the opportunity to practice these newly learned
skills, children are less likely to further expand and en-
hance those skills and competencies, thus hindering
their overall developmental process [12].
Denying children the rights of freedom and autonomy
would pose an ethical problem if they were denied solely
on the basis of their chronological age, with no corre-
sponding association to some other quality (that was
ethically relevant). In fact, these rights are only withheld
from children based on the assumption of an association
between chronological age and the competencies deemed
necessary for the possession of the rights [16]. The dividing
line between these two stages of decision-making involve-
ment will depend on the specific qualities the individual
society deems necessary for an individual to be consid-
ered capable and mature enough to be involved in the
decision-making [10]. It seems that there will be no
single chronological age when all individuals possess a
specific competence for the first time, thus entitling
them to the possession of the corresponding right [12].
So, whatever the boundary, there will be some individuals
who will be capable but not recognised as such and some
which are not capable but are taken to be so. This observa-
tion misses the need for policy however. The goal of policy
is to manage and guide practice, not to entirely circum-
scribe what is ethically warranted but to capture the
majority of cases on either side without being arbitrary.
It is clear then, that the argument for an assent*
process grounded in the child’s fundamental human rights
will not work. Children do possess rights as human beings,
but that does not imply that all children should be allowed
either to determine or even to contribute to decisions
about their own welfare. There are specific criteria to be
met for the possession of such rights and there remains an
association between chronological age and the attainment
of these competency criteria. Most importantly, the pos-
session of these rights as rights which entitle involvement
need justification and, in particular a justification that is
distinct from the justification associated with full adult
competence. Children who are only able to assent* are by
definition not able to consent. It is far from clear that the
rights defence of an assent* process, unassisted by inde-
pendent argument, can justify the kinds of involvement
practices that are usually associated with assent*.
Best interests
A second common ethical justification for assent* stems
from the idea that a child’s best interests must be the
overriding factor in any decision that will affect that
child [17]. On this view, the child’s assent* acts as a way
of providing evidence for what is in the child’s interests.
However, in the medical context, it is precisely a con-
cern for the child’s best interests, both short-term and
long-term, that motivates us to deny children any degree
of self-determination. Ultimate medical decision-making
power currently rests solely with the child’s caretakers,
rather than shared with the child, until the child reaches
the legal age of majority [1, 16]. The assumption here is
that parents or guardians are the people best acquainted
with their children and therefore they should be capable
of making decisions that are truly in the best interests of
their child and the child’s future adult self [18].
However, while it is hoped that the decisions made by
parents on behalf of their children are in fact in the best
interests of those children, there are too many examples
of situations when this is not the case. On an extreme
level, cases of child neglect and abuse illustrate that not
all parents and guardians truly have a child’s best inter-
ests at heart. A parent or guardian could also justify a
decision that he knows is against the desires of a child
by merely stating that the decision had been made ac-
cording to the best interests principle [19]. Beyond these
more severe instances, even a well-intentioned parent
will be making a decision based on his own subjective
opinion of the child’s “best interests”, a concept nearly
impossible to define [17]. A child’s best interests may
change over time, depending on that child’s age, devel-
opmental stage, culture, and current environment. It is
often suggested that one should consider the future
adult that the child will become, making the decision
that this future adult would make [12, 17]. This is some-
times described as “future-oriented consent”: as a child be-
comes a rational adult he will recognize the wisdom in
those past decisions and lend his support to them [9, 16].
The problem with this suggestion, however, is that it can
never be known what a child’s future adult self might
think about the situation. Instead, a decision can only be
made that in the current view would seem to be the best
possible decision for the child at that time [16]. The deci-
sions that parents make on behalf of their child shape the
future person that child will become, thereby affecting
what his best interests are going to be. If that is the case,
those best interests cannot then be used as criteria in the
current decision.
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Acting according to the best interests principle will
not allow us to provide an appropriate ethical justification
for the process of assent*. We routinely take it that the
parent or guardian has the authority to determine what
the child’s interests are except in certain cases where vari-
ous forms of medical authority take precedence.
Developing autonomy
A more widely accepted and natural justification for
assent* in the literature is related to respect for the child’s
developing autonomy [3, 13, 14]. As children mature from
infancy through to adulthood, their maturation is not
purely physical but also mental, with the development of
increasing cognitive capacities and an expanding ability
for self-determination. Adults are asked for their informed
consent to research participation out of respect for the fact
that they are autonomous individuals and their decisions
should be respected [15]. If all instances of full autonomy
must be respected, it could be argued that instances of
partial autonomy should also be respected [20]. It seems
plausible that when a child has developed sufficient cogni-
tive abilities to make decisions about his own interests, he
should be allowed a corresponding degree of control over
these interests [17, 21]. Asking a child to participate in the
decision-making process allows him a voice in the discus-
sion, to the extent that his current cognitive capacity will
allow [3]. It looks reasonable, on this view, to assess the
child’s current capacities in order to have an idea as to
what level of decision-making contribution he can be ex-
pected to make. This participation not only respects the
child’s increasing abilities, but also gives that child a safe
forum in which to learn and practice decision-making.
However, the argument that the justification for the
child’s involvement in the decision-making process lies
in respect for his developing autonomy is problematic
for several reasons. First, the attempt to describe children
as “competent” or “incompetent” to assent* is misleading.
The idea of assent* is relevant here precisely because chil-
dren are not considered to be sufficiently competent to
make their own decisions. To then introduce a second level
of competence, now applied to a child’s ability to be in-
volved in the decision-making process rather than making
the entire decision himself, further complicates the issue
and makes it even more likely that there will be confusion
regarding which children should be involved. In fact, this
terminology has generated much confusion and has led
some researchers to recommend lowering the age of con-
sent to include these “competent” minors, bypassing assent*
altogether [22]. If a set of criteria is proposed by which to
judge an individual’s competence to provide his own con-
sent, anyone not meeting those criteria should be labelled
as incompetent. There cannot then be a reclassification of
some of these individuals as “quasi-competent” (which is
essentially what “competent to assent*” means) based on a
different set of criteria.
A second problem with the developing autonomy ar-
gument rests with the ideas of “partial autonomy” and
“partial respect”. If instances of complete autonomy
are fully respected, and instances of a complete lack of
autonomy are not respected, then instances of partial
autonomy would seem to justify partial respect. Yet it
is unclear how “partial autonomy” and “partial respect”
can be defined. Autonomy and respect are traditionally
binary concepts [23]: a choice is either autonomous or
non-autonomous, and something can either be respected
or not respected. The process of assent* covers a broad
range of capacities and this range would seem to be
greater than any similar range among autonomous adults.
The term “partial autonomy” poses a problem as it is not
obvious how to determine whether an individual choice is
autonomous and thus should be respected. Assent* repre-
sents an attempt to engage with children who exist along
a sliding scale of competence found between a non-
autonomous infant and a fully autonomous adult [24].
When confronted with a choice by a normally functioning
adult, it is assumed that he is autonomous unless proven
otherwise, and therefore his choice is also assumed to be
autonomous. But these assumptions do not apply to a
child’s “partial autonomy”. In this case, a child is already
considered as not fully autonomous, so one interpretation
of “partial autonomy” would seem to be that only a subset
of the child’s choices are autonomous while the rest are
not. It is then necessary to distinguish between his choices
that are autonomous and those that are non-autonomous.
However, if this is the case then the child’s autonomous
choices should be accorded full respect precisely because
they are autonomous, and therefore this would be justifi-
cation for seeking his consent in these instances rather
than assent*. The problem as it relates to assent* is that
the developing autonomy argument has already indicated
that partial autonomy warrants only “partial respect”, a
notion that is no easier to grasp. “Partial respect” of a
child’s decisions would seem to indicate that some of his
decisions would be respected while other decisions would
not be respected. This is problematic as none of the child’s
decisions are being respected in the assent* process.
Assent* currently allows some children to be involved in
the decision-making process, yet the child’s decision is ul-
timately not accorded respect since a child’s decision can
be overridden [25–27]. This usually occurs when the
child’s decision is in conflict with the views of the clinician
researcher and parents about what is medically in his best
interests [27]. A child’s decision is not accepted as an au-
thority when finalizing the clinical research procedures,
leaving open the possibility that the final decision reached
might be contradictory to the child’s stated preference. In
this occurrence, “partial respect” would in effect have no
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meaning. If the child’s decision is not taken into account
when making the final decision, then it is not being
respected. Therefore, although a child does develop the
capacity for autonomy throughout childhood, it is unclear
how the idea of respecting this developing capacity can
serve to justify the process of assent* primarily because
the assent* process does not amount to respecting the
decisions of the child – the parent or guardian in most
cases provides the authoritative decision.
Some might argue that respect for developing autonomy
requires that we engage with the child precisely because of
his developing autonomy. Yet why should the fact that an
individual’s autonomy is developing automatically mean
that we should engage with him? Usually it is the posses-
sion of autonomy that is taken to be of ethical significance;
that is, when the individual possesses the capacity, his de-
cisions ought to be respected. In the case of developing
autonomy, the individual does not possess the requisite
capacity and so, the justification for respect is absent.
Pedagogical role
So far this paper has examined how the ethical ground-
ing for the involvement of young children in medical
decision-making does not stem from children’s rights,
the principle of best interests, or respect for their devel-
oping autonomy. An alternative strategy is to examine
the original motivation to engage with the child. We
might suggest that involving a child in the decision-
making process about a clinical research procedure that
affects him is motivated by the researcher’s obligations
to the child: how the researcher ought to act towards
that child. A medical researcher confronted with a po-
tential child participant may feel that he ought to engage
with the child in some way about the decision-making
process. This obligation is less about something pos-
sessed by the child, such as his fundamental human
rights or developing autonomy, but about the obligation
of the researcher towards that child.
So what is that obligation? In order to formulate an
answer to this question, the problem should be exam-
ined from the opposite perspective. Instead of searching
for something in the child that grounds the obligation
on the researcher to involve him in the decision, we
might begin by examining the benefits that the child
might receive if he were to be involved in the decision-
making process. One obvious benefit for the child would
be that his involvement would teach him how to become
a better decision-maker.3 The pedagogical move is a very
familiar one – in order to learn how to perform a task
properly, the student must be given an opportunity to
try and to fail [but in a protected way]. So in the case of
decision-making the child is learning how to make deci-
sions by practicing them and sometimes, perhaps often,
making mistakes. By allowing the child to participate in
the decision, without placing the onus on the child to
make the entire decision, he is given the opportunity to
practice decision-making while still under the protection
of his caretakers and other adults such as doctors and
nurses. Here, the importance lies in the appropriate en-
gagement with a child, rather than on soliciting a finite
“yes” or “no” response from the child. When the engage-
ment is done poorly, either by the parent or the re-
searcher, a child certainly might become disillusioned if
he believes that his decisions are not being followed.
However, this does not mean that appropriate engage-
ment with children cannot be a very positive learning
experience. The process of assent* utilizes his developing
capacities and gives him a voice in matters which affect
him, but most importantly it allows him to practice his
decision-making skills in order to further enhance his
development and become a better decision-maker as an
adult [13, 24, 28, 29].
The key difference between this argument and one
grounded in developing autonomy is the important dis-
tinction between respecting a decision and encouraging
a decision. It is true that a child is developing increasing
cognitive capacities throughout childhood, thereby forming
improved decision-making abilities [20, 30]. This decision-
making should be encouraged in order to further the child’s
development [21, 30], but that encouragement does not
need to be justified by respect. Instead, encouraging the
child’s newly developed decision-making capacities is
based upon the aim of teaching him, and not, in fact,
respecting him.
Yet on further analysis, while assent* does teach chil-
dren to become better decision-makers, this pedagogical
role does not completely justify the act of involving a
child in the decision-making process. If the sole concern
were to teach children to make decisions, then the main
focus of the obligation would be one that assists the parent
rather than the child. Parents are ultimately responsible for
this pedagogical role, determining throughout a child’s up-
bringing when and under what circumstances the child de-
velops his capacity for autonomy and reasoning [3, 29, 31].
It is up to the parents to determine where the child falls on
the spectrum of decision-making development at any given
time. A good parent,4 who is successful in rearing his child
to become an autonomous adult, will teach the child to
adopt a perspective towards himself that is very like an ideal
parental perspective [31]. This in effect means that the child
will learn how to make good decisions based on the ex-
ample the parent has set when making decisions for and on
behalf of the child while under parental care. By adopting
this ideal parental perspective as his own, the child will
learn how to recognize what really is in his best interests,
thereby learning the process of good decision-making, al-
though not necessarily making the same decision that his
parents would make. So, to be a “good parent”, one has the
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obligation to teach one’s children to be autonomous. In the
context of medical decision-making, the researcher has the
obligation to respect this parental obligation by allowing
the parents to teach their child. Assent*, then, could be
viewed as another pedagogical tool that parents can adopt
in the overall education and nurturing of their child.5 In
this respect, the researcher’s role is to assist and facilitate
the kind of learning and perhaps the means of learning that
the parents have adopted. Given that the parents are
responsible for constructing the context in which a
child develops his autonomy, this then implies that the
parents should be allowed to determine whether or not
their child should be included in the decision-making
process, putting the onus on the parents rather than
the investigator. This means that the researcher would
engage with the child only in such a way that fits in
with the individual pedagogical techniques of the child’s
parents, thereby customizing his interaction and in-
volvement with the child depending on how the child’s
parents would like him to do so.6
However, as noted above, when seeking a child’s in-
volvement in the medical decision-making process, it
looks as though the researcher’s natural focus is primarily
with the child rather than with his parents. This illustrates
that, in addition to his obligations to the parents, the re-
searcher also has an obligation to the child. This is seen
most clearly in a situation where a researcher believes the
child should be involved in the decision-making process
but the parents do not agree (or vice versa). If assent* were
purely justified by its pedagogical role and absent any clear
issue of the child’s interests, the researcher would be con-
tent to accept the parental view that the child is not yet
capable of participating in the decision. The judgment that
a particular child ought to be involved, even against the
opinion of his parental caretaker, demonstrates that the
researcher believes that some involvement or assent* is
ethically important because he feels that he has a duty
specifically to the child, not the parents.
This realization is the key in completing the justification
for assent*. In paediatric settings there are two obligations
on the researcher: an obligation to the parents who lead
the pedagogical role for their individual child, and an obli-
gation to the child himself. These two obligations are most
clearly seen when they conflict: when the researcher feels
that the child should participate in the decision, while the
child’s parents disagree. This conflict illustrates that the
pedagogical role is not sufficient as the only justification
for assent*. If it were, then the researcher would be able to
pass off to the parents any involvement with the child,
providing them with all of the information and asking
them to involve their child to the degree that they see
fit. However this would not absolve the researcher of
his own obligation to the child. Therefore it is clear that
there must be an additional element to the justification for
assent*: one that addresses this second obligation of the
researcher.
Moral worth
Although the researcher has an obligation to the child,
independent of his obligation to the parents, the grounds
of this obligation are not clear. Some philosophers have
argued that autonomous individuals have moral worth7
because they are autonomous [32]. Following this logic, a
non-autonomous child cannot have moral worth. How-
ever by asking a child for assent* he is being treated as
having moral worth [13]. While a child is not autonomous,
he is not equated with an inanimate object or a non-
autonomous being with whom all communication is
impossible. Instead the inherent value of the child is
recognized, illustrating that he warrants treatment as a
being of worth. This recognition of the child’s inherent
value and worth can play an important role in justifying
the process of assent*. The child ought to be involved
in the decision-making process about his own life rather
than let adults make all of those decisions for him with no
engagement from the child. Furthermore, a child will
come to understand he is of value by being treated as if he
is of value. Past research in paediatrics has indicated that
children feel appreciated and valued when they are in-
volved in some capacity in the medical decision-making
process [33, 34]. This involvement is a sign of respect
[35, 36] and teaches the child his inherent value and
worth as an individual, a notion that will affect not just
his ability to make good decisions but also every other
aspect of his life as an autonomous being [37]. In fact,
the development of a sense of moral worth is a funda-
mental step in a child’s overall maturation from child
to adult.8 Without this sense, an individual is likely to
struggle to have a happy and normally-functioning life.
In the medical context, this sense of worth has been
documented as having an effect on the emotional status
of the child patient. Children have reported feelings of
distress and anger when they were excluded from the
decision-making process regarding their medical treatment,
while children who were included in that process have
experienced decreased nervousness or anxiety [33, 34,
38–40]. The process of assent*, or involving the child
in the overall decision-making process, therefore, is an
important way in which respect for the child as an indi-
vidual can be demonstrated. The value lies not in the
response given by the child but the fact that his views
were solicited in the first place.
One might ask how this argument relates to a flat re-
fusal by a child to participate in research (in other
words, his dissent) in a case where that child lacks au-
tonomy. If we think that the child’s refusal should be
respected, by definition, it cannot be because we ought
to respect the child’s autonomy. There must be some
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other account – moral worth. However, we might also
think that the child’s parents have an important role
here. If the parents are strongly committed to the child
participating in the research, we can imagine cases where
we may think it appropriate to continue to try to persuade
or convince the child to do so. There are many ways of
doing this depending on the age and development of the
child, and often parents are very well equipped with such
strategies, but all of these would require that the moral
worth of the child be considered.
Conclusions
The need for appropriate approaches to assent* in children
has recently been restated and emphasized [4]. This paper
has demonstrated that some of the common justifications
for the process of assent* found in the literature are incom-
plete and do not, in fact, provide a full justification for the
assent* process as an element of the overall enrolment
process in paediatric research. Instead, assent* should be
understood as playing a pedagogical role for the child, help-
ing to teach him how the specific decisions are made and
therefore helping him to become a better decision-maker
in the future. Here, the researcher is working with the par-
ents to help teach their child to be autonomous, fulfilling
an obligation to the parents who lead this pedagogical role
in the context of their family. Of course, the researcher
must also recognize a potentially competing obligation to
the child, regardless of the parents’ pedagogical techniques.
How the researcher engages with the child supports his
obligation to the child’s parents, yet why the researcher
engages with the child stems from the child’s moral
worth. By involving the child in the decision-making
process, he is being treated as having moral worth and
therefore learns that he is a being of moral worth. Part
of the importance of the distinction between respecting
autonomy and respecting moral worth is that it is not
necessarily linked to the actual decision-making au-
thority. Treating children as being valuable in them-
selves (as having moral worth) need not mean doing
what they say but it may mean listening, considering,
engaging or involving them in the decision. This is a
new justification for assent* than has been seen previ-
ously in the literature precisely because it moves away
from the tendency to tie the researcher’s obligation to
engage with the child with the capacities of that child.
The moral worth of the child gives the researcher an
important ethical reason to treat that child with respect.
One way of treating the child with respect is to involve
him in the decision-making process to an extent that is
appropriate to his ability to engage. Therefore, the focus of
the researcher’s obligation does not stem from the child’s
ability but from his moral worth. The child’s abilities and
other contextual features help to shape the way in which
the engagement proceeds. Once again, it is important to
note that this paper has outlined a novel justification for
the process of assent*. The novelty lies in the justification
itself, not that children have moral worth or the fact that
assent* is often obtained within current paediatric clinical
research. This is a claim about the justification of the
assent* process, and therefore it holds even if others have
acknowledged, either in practice or in print, that children
have moral worth.
Based on this ethical foundation for the concept of
assent*, we can begin to move forward with the develop-
ment of an appropriate logistical model for assent*.
Given that one of the key elements of the justification of
assent* stems from the parents’ pedagogical obligation
to their child, then at the very least the determination of
a child’s ability to participate in the assent* process should
include an understanding of the child’s family context and
degree of involvement in other kinds of decisions. Further
research on assent* should focus not on the search for an
ideal age or competence level for assent*, but instead on
how a child’s family context can be considered and in-
cluded in the overall assessment of how and when to
involve that child in the decision-making process. Fur-
thermore, while the arguments presented in this paper
focused specifically on the process of assent* within the
context of paediatric research, the conclusions drawn
regarding the ethical justification for the assent* process
can and should apply to all paediatric contexts – both
research and clinical.
Endnotes
1This practice varies in different parts of the world. In
this paper we are addressing only those countries where
assent is an existing practice. This paper does not address
international differences in how the law defines compe-
tence, but instead any discussion of competence refers to
the philosophical or ethical definition of competence.
2The process of philosophical argumentation involved
in this paper does not claim that acknowledging a child’s
moral worth is a new concept. What has not been done
in the field of ethics and philosophical ethics, and what
this paper does, is to connect the requirement that we
get assent with the idea of the child’s moral worth. It is
this connection, this justification of assent, that is the
distinctive element of this paper. The distinctions drawn
in this paper are distinctions about the way in which we
justify the involvement of children who lack capacity in
decisions about their participation in clinical research. It
does not question whether children have moral worth,
nor claim that this suggestion is new, but uses this
idea in a novel way to justify their involvement in the
decision-making process.
3This argument is distinct from one based on a child’s
best interests. The reason that we teach a child might
not make reference to a child’s interests at all, even
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though it coincides with them. If we argue, for example,
that the child has certain rights (one of which is to be
taught to be a decision-maker) then our reason will not
be paternalistic but will be about maintaining these
rights. The key issue, and the one with which we are
concerned in this paper, involves the justification of par-
ticular actions. Involving a child because it is best for him
is just a different reason for involvement from involving
him in order to teach him to decide. The way to see this
difference is to observe cases where they pull apart –
where the teaching is a right and done because of this, or
where, in fact, learning to decide is not overall best.
4A “good parent” here is defined as one who cares for
the health and well being of the child and therefore does
not abuse or neglect his child.
5It is useful to be clear about the distinction between
the pedagogical obligation and respecting the parents’
autonomy on how to raise their child. Parents are
charged with the task of raising their child. In this re-
spect they have an obligation to teach the child to be a
decision-maker (among other things). In this paper we
suggest that the researcher, in encouraging the child to
‘practice’ decision-making in the research context, assists
in this obligation. However this is assistance in dischar-
ging a parental obligation and is distinct from the auton-
omy that we give parents to decide how this obligation
is discharged. The right of the parents to decide how to
raise their child certainly ought to be respected for the
most part, (however there are standard cases where we
limit parental freedoms). In the case of the assent*
process this will amount to perhaps involving the child
to the extent that the parents are comfortable or in the
way they normally do in their daily lives.
6We acknowledge that there are potentially other
people involved in a child’s life besides his parents from
whom he learns through engagement, however the main
point for this paper is that the child’s parents have an
authority and responsibility for him which other adults
do not.
7The term “moral worth” is common in philosophical
usage. For the purposes of this paper, we understand
moral worth to refer to the intrinsic moral value of a
person, the recognition of which can morally inform our
actions with respect to that individual. More on this def-
inition can be found in numerous philosophical writings,
including Rosati [31], Dillon [41], Vlastos [42], and
Wittwer [43].
8We recognize that children can develop attachment
relationships to other people besides their parents and
that these relationships are also instrumental in developing
a child’s overall sense of moral worth. There is certainly a
rich body of psychology literature on development theory,
and more to be said about self worth and its nature, but
that is beyond the remit of this paper.
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